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abstract: Ricardo salinas Pliego was the Ceo of Grupo salinas, one of the largest business 
groups in mexico, and in 2009 he faced a challenge. two years earlier, he had negotiated with 
the Chinese car company faW to import Chinese cars into mexico as an initial step towards their 
manufacturing. However, the global crisis of 2008 made him question the viability of the project 
and he had to decide whether to close the operation or continue in the hope of a quick recovery. 
this was a difficult decision because the group had sold several thousand cars and established 
a network of car dealers. Closing the operation would mean not only losing the investment in 
the network while having to continue servicing the cars, but would also result in a blow to the 
reputation of the group. He was pondering what the best option would be. 
Keywords: alliances, international joint ventures, developing country multinationals, emerging 
markets, China, mexico, failure.
grupo salinas
Grupo salinas was one of the largest business groups, or conglomerates, in 
mexico. By 2009, it had around 45,000 employees working in argentina, 
Brazil, el salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, mexico, Panama, Peru and the 
United states, and had sales of 63 billion mexican pesos (approximately 
Us$4.6 billion). 
Grupo salinas was composed of four segments:
1) media. azteca tv was the second-largest producer of Hispanic televi-
sion content in the world. it operated two national television networks 
in mexico, serving 110 million people through more than 300 stations. 
in 2001, azteca america was launched to provide tv azteca’s content 
to U.s. affiliates. 
2) Retail and finance. Grupo elektra was latin america’s leading mass-
market specialty retailer, selling electronics, household appliances, fur-
niture, transportation equipment, telephones, and computers, as well as 
providing financing to facilitate the purchases. it operated 1,900 points 
of sale in argentina, Brazil, el salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Pa-
nama, and mexico. azteca finance division included all operations that 
offered financial services to consumers.
3) telecommunications. iusacell provided wireless telephony in mexico. 
it served 3.4 million subscribers, or approximately 7% of the mexican 
wireless telecommunications market.
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prodUcir aUtos cHinos en mÉxico: la alianZa entre el 
grUpo salinas y Faw 
resUmen: Ricardo salinas Pliego era el Ceo del Grupo salinas, uno de los 
mayores grupos empresariales de méxico, y en 2009 enfrentó un desafío. 
dos años antes había negociado con faW, la empresa automotriz china, 
para importar autos chinos a méxico como un paso inicial hacia su manu-
factura. sin embargo, la crisis global de 2008 le hizo cuestionar la viabi-
lidad del proyecto y tuvo que decidir si cerrar la operación o continuar con 
la esperanza de una recuperación rápida. fue una decisión difícil porque el 
grupo había vendido varios miles de carros y había establecido una red de 
concesionarios. Cerrar la operación significaría no sólo perder la inversión 
en la red y al tiempo tener que continuar prestando mantenimiento a los 
autos, sino además un golpe para la reputación del grupo. salinas reflexio-
naba sobre cuál era la mejor opción. 
palabras claVe: alianzas, empresas conjuntas internacionales, multi-
nacionales de países en desarrollo, mercados emergentes, China, méxico, 
fracaso. 
prodUire des VoitUres cHinoises aU mexiqUe : l’alliance 
entre le groUpe salinas et Faw
rÉsUmÉ : Ricardo salina Pliego était le directeur général du Groupe sa-
linas, l’une des plus importantes entreprises du mexique, et en 2009 il 
s’est trouvé face à un défi. deux années auparavant, il avait négocié avec 
faW, l’entreprise automobile chinoise, pour importer au mexique des autos 
chinoises comme un premier pas vers leur montage. Cependant, la crise 
globale de 2008 l’avait fait s’interroger sur la viabilité du projet et il s’était 
demandé s’il devait annuler l’opération ou continuer avec l’espoir d’une 
récupération rapide. Ce fut une décision difficile car le groupe avait vendu 
plusieurs milliers de voitures et organisé un réseau de concessionnaires. 
annuler l’opération ne signifiait pas seulement perdre l’investissement 
dans le réseau mais devoir continuer à assurer l’entretien des autos, outre 
un coup porté à la réputation du groupe. salinas s’interrogeait sur le choix 
qui serait le meilleur.
mots-clÉs : alliances, entreprises conjointes internationales, multina-
tionales de pays en développement, marchés émergents, Chine, mexique, 
échec.
prodUZir carros cHineses no mÉxico: a parceria do grUpo 
salinas com a Faw 
resUmo: Ricardo salinas Pliego era o Ceo do Grupo salinas, um dos 
maiores grupos empresariais do méxico e, em 2009, enfrentou um desafio. 
dois anos antes, havia negociado com a faW, a empresa automotiva chi-
nesa, para importar carros chineses ao méxico como um passo inicial para 
a sua fabricação. no entanto, a crise global de 2008 fez com que ele ques-
tionasse a viabilidade do projeto e teve que decidir se fechar a operação 
ou continuar com a esperança de una recuperação rápida. foi una decisão 
difícil porque o grupo havia vendido vários milhares de carros e havia esta-
belecido uma rede de concessionários. fechar a operação significaria, não 
só perder o investimento na rede e, ao mesmo tempo, ter de continuar pres-
tando manutenção aos carros, mas também um golpe para a reputação do 
grupo. salinas refletia sobre qual era a melhor opção. 
palaVras-cHaVe: Parcerias, empresas conjuntas internacionais, mul-
tinacionais de países em desenvolvimento, mercados emergentes, China, 
méxico, fracasso.
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4) social responsibility. fundación azteca and fundación 
azteca america were non-profit organizations dedi-
cated to improving health, nutrition, education, and 
the environment. fomento Cultural Grupo salinas pro-
moted the preservation of mexico’s cultural heritage. 
History of grupo salinas
Grupo salinas started operations in 1906 in monterrey, in 
the state of nuevo leon in northern mexico, with a furni-
ture factory that Benjamín salinas Westrup opened with 
his brother-in-law Joel Rocha. in the 1920s, they estab-
lished their first store, called salinas y Rocha, in downtown 
monterrey. Unlike other companies at the time, they not 
only sold furniture but also provided credit to facilitate pur-
chases, which became the formula for success that enabled 
the company to become one of the largest business groups 
in mexico. in 1950, Hugo salinas Rocha, son of Benjamín 
salinas, started manufacturing radios and televisions. in 
1952, Hugo salinas Price, the grandson of the founder and 
son of Hugo salinas Rocha, was appointed general man-
ager of the business. in 1959, he opened the first elektra 
store. By 1968, elektra had 12 stores in monterrey.
the company faced challenges to its business model. in 
1976, the devaluation of the peso against the dollar forced 
the company to temporarily suspend its credit system. in 
1987, Hugo salinas Price retired and named Ricardo sa-
linas Pliego, his son, as the new Ceo of Grupo elektra. in 
the middle of a deep economic crisis and facing the possi-
bility of bankruptcy, Ricardo salinas restructured elektra. He 
established a new business model: low margins, a policy 
of cash-only payments, and a basic product line. With this, 
the firm slowly returned to profitability. in 1989 he resumed 
the provision of credit to consumers. in 1993, elektra started 
quoting in the mexican stock exchange. 
the group continued to diversify in the 1990s. in 1993, 
a group of shareholders led by mr. salinas Pliego purchased 
the state-owned imevisión, which controlled channels 13 and 
7, and changed its name to tv azteca. in 1996, tv azteca 
began to produce soap operas, establishing digital azteca 
and azteca music. in 1997, tv azteca began quoting in 
the mexican stock exchange and the new york stock ex-
change. in 1996, elektra created Dinero Express, a money 
transfer system in mexico. in 1998, azteca tv made a 
strategic investment in Unefon, a wireless telephone ser-
vices company. in 2000, the salinas Group was established 
under a new structure and azteca tv opened its U.s. sub-
sidiary to focus on the Hispanic market. in 2002, the group 
obtained a license to create azteca Bank, which operated 
in the elektra stores and provided credit to customers. 
a year later, it started operating an afore (management 
service retirement fund). that same year, the company ac-
quired the majority of iusacell, which was the third-largest 
mobile operator in mexico. in 2005, the company began to 
franchise its elektra brand to expand in latin america. By 
2010 it had 795 stores in mexico, 50 in Peru, 47 in Gua-
temala, 23 in Honduras, 12 in Panama, 13 in argentina, 
and 7 in Brazil.
the automobile industry in mexico
the role of the automotive industry in mexico’s economy 
was important.  it represented 19% of manufacturing 
GdP and 3.5% of total GdP; exports of auto parts ac-
counted for 12% of total exports; employment generated 
by the auto industry represented 13% of manufacturing 
employment; and flows of foreign direct investment in 
auto parts were 15% of total fdi flows to the manu-
facturing sector (Ciiam, 2008). some 650,000 people 
worked in the automobile industry directly, and 2.5 mil-
lion people indirectly once distribution, repair, and supply 
of parts and gasoline were included (Quadratín, 2008). 
this industry was the main source of foreign exchange 
within the manufacturing sector. 
By 2007, mexico produced about 2 million light vehicles. 
of these, 1.5 million were exported (see figure 1). vehi-
cles produced in mexico included the Chevrolet HHR, Gm 
crossover, Chrysler pickup trucks, vW Beetle and Jetta, 
Honda accord, nissan versa and tsuru, ford fusion, and 
lincoln mKZ (Greene, 2007). additionally, about 1.2 mil-
lion vehicles entered mexico with temporary permits or 
were legally imported. many of them were second-hand 
high-mileage automobiles from the United states, which 
were marketed informally. 
FigUre 1. automobile assembly plants in mexico
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from 2004 to 2007, demand for new cars was over one mil-
lion units annually (see figure 2). there was an unmet de-
mand in the middle and lower classes, which represented 
63% of the national population. since three quarters of them 
did not have a car, there was a potential market of 31 mil-
lion consumers who needed an inexpensive, reliable, low-con-
sumption, and low-maintenance car (santana, 2007).
the automobile industry was highly regulated (Prensa 
de negocios, 2008). in 1990, the government issued the 
decree titled Promotion of the modernization of the au-
tomotive industry to support exports and improve the in-
ternational competitiveness of automobile producers. this 
resulted in a large trade deficit, as the import of mate-
rials and components increased. the government tried to 
reduce the deficit via regulation. according to the auto 
decree 2005, any company wishing to import duty-free 
vehicles into mexico would have to make a minimum in-
vestment of $100 million in a new plant with an output 
of 50,000 vehicles per year (fernández, 2006). otherwise, 
an import fee had to be paid for all imported automo-
tive vehicles not manufactured in mexico (Gobierno de la 
República, 2003).
FigUre 2. domestic sale of Vehicles in mexico, 2000-2008
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building chinese cars in mexico
elektra sought to increase the variety of goods in the stores 
to grow and face competitors. in 2003, it started selling 
tires and quickly became the third largest dealer in mexico. 
the success in selling tires led to the importation of Chi-
nese motorbikes, under the name italika, which became 
a very profitable and successful venture. By 2007, italika 
motorcycles represented 56% of all units sold in mexico. 
these successes spurred interest in cars. the company had 
more than 20 years of experience importing products from 
China to mexico (martínez, 2007).
Grupo salinas wanted to replicate the success of italika 
and decided to search for a partner with world-class tech-
nology that could produce low-priced cars to sell to the 
low-income market that was not being served by other 
brands. according to Javier sarro, chairman of the trans-
portation division of Grupo salinas, it took two years of 
analysis and research (avilés, 2007). 
in 2007, Grupo salinas started a formal search for a Chi-
nese partner to enter the car industry. the major Chinese 
manufacturers were faW, Geely, BaW Beijing automobile 
Works, Beigi futon Chery automotive, dongo feng motor, 
and Chana. managers of Grupo salinas had talks with more 
than 10 Chinese automobile manufacturers, but the talks 
with Geely were the most promising. Geely was created 
in 1986 and started producing cars in 1997. it was head-
quartered in Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang province, 
and operated six plants with a total production capacity of 
approximately 300,000 cars per year. Unfortunately, talks 
with Geely were unsuccessful. 
thus, Group salinas partnered with faW. founded in 1953, 
first automobile Works (faW) was one of the five major 
Chinese car manufacturers. the reforms initiated in 1978 
saw the growth and transformation of the firm. it incorpo-
rated many Japanese production techniques into its manu-
facturing process to enhance efficiency. in the 1980s, the 
company moved away from the priorities of a traditional 
state enterprise to that of a profit-driven organization. in 
1991, faW joined volkswagen in the production of auto-
mobiles, and in the period 1991-2001 it formed joint ven-
tures with other foreign firms like toyota, mazda, and audi. 
By 2006, it was one the largest vehicle manufacturers in 
China with 1.4 million cars produced and 140,000 em-
ployees. faW exported cars to 70 countries and, in addi-
tion to producing under its own brand; it had joint ventures 
with toyota, audi, Hyundai, volkswagen, and mazda 
(avilés, 2007; Hoyo, 2007).
grupo salinas motors business plan
Grupo salinas and faW signed a memorandum of under-
standing in 2007 to start marketing cars in mexico by the 
first quarter of 2008. they had a long-term project and 
plans to introduce a new line of automobiles in mexico for 
low-income consumers, a new market segment that was 
underserved (Gallegos, 2008).
FigUre 3. Faw models sold in mexico
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source: elektra.
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initially the vehicles were imported from China, and after 
three years, they would be produced in mexico. this would 
enable Grupo salinas to avoid the 50% import duties that 
Chinese cars would face, which would render them uncom-
petitive and unprofitable. 
they planned to price imported vehicles below the av-
erage of those sold by competitors in mexico. the three 
models offered by faW were: the f1 line (1.0-liter engine) 
in its sedan and hatchback versions; the f4 (1.4-liter engine), 
which had the same platform and basic versions and equip-
ment; and the f5 in sedan and hatchback (Gallegos, 2008) 
(see figure 3). the prices of the cars in mexico were: (1) f1 
Basic Hatchback, 69,900 pesos (Us$6,300); (2) f1 luxury 
Hatchback, 74,900 pesos (Us$6,850); (3) f1 luxury 
sedan, 86,900 pesos (Us$7,900); (4) f4 Basic sedan, 
89,900 pesos (Us$8,180); (5) f4 luxury sedan, 96,900 
pesos (Us$8,815); (6) f5 luxury Hatchback, 104,900 
pesos (Us$9,536); (7) f5 luxury sedan, 114,900 pesos 
(Us$10,445).
Cars were sold and financed through a weekly payment 
system. azteca Bank provided financing, with a down pay-
ment of 10% to 30% and interest rates ranging from 12% 
to 20%. it had several financing schemes. for example, the 
f1 hatchback, basic version, was sold with a 30% down 
payment, 60 months to pay, and payments of 330 pesos 
per week. furthermore, it included vehicle maintenance. 
for an additional 50 pesos more per month, insurance was 
provided. Seguros Azteca (the insurance company of the 
Grupo salinas) provided the insurance (elektra, 2010).
assembly plant
Grupo salinas planned to build a plant in Zinapécuaro in 
the state of michoacán to manufacture and export com-
pact cars at low prices, using domestic automotive compo-
nents (see figure 4 for the location of the plant and figure 
5 for pictures of the site). it would create about 2,000 di-
rect jobs and about 14,000 indirect jobs and was hailed 
as the largest Chinese investment in mexico. the assembly 
line was located in the town of Zinapécuaro, with an initial 
investment of Us$150 million, and with a later investment 
of Us$100 million to create a distribution and service net-
work (avilés, 2007). salinas and faW Group decided that 
to be competitive in the segment of inexpensive cars, they 
needed high production volumes. therefore, they planned 
a second phase to increase capacity to 200,000 units per 
year for the domestic and export markets. the automotive 
plant had two access paths, one from the mexico-Guadala-
jara Highway, and the other from the old road to Zinapéc-
uaro, michoacán. the latter was ideal for production and 
FigUre 4. map of mexico with the location of the grupo 
salinas-Faw alliance plant in michoacán state
source: Wikimedia Commons (2011).
FigUre 5. photographs of plant site in mexico and First 
stone ceremony
source: Presidencia de la República (2007) and authors.
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logistics for export markets throughout the americas from 
the port of lázaro Cárdenas.
this plant was supposed to begin car production by 2010, 
so it could meet the rising demand in the country and 
export to latin america, beginning with destinations in 
which Grupo salinas was already present like Brazil, argen-
tina, Guatemala, Peru, Honduras, and Panama. faW had a 
keen interest in exploring the possibility of selling to the 
Us and Canadian markets from mexico (santana, 2007).
on november 23rd, 2007, the first stone was placed where 
the faW automobile assembly plant was supposed to be 
built, with the presence of the President of the mexican Re-
public, felipe Calderón Hinojosa, the director of Grupo sa-
linas, Ricardo salinas Pliego, the President of faW, Ceo Zhu 
yanfeng, and the governor of michoacán, lázaro Cárdenas 
Batel. in the opening ceremony, President Calderón said 
that the automaker would help social segments with little 
chance of getting a car acquire one at modest prices. Ri-
cardo salinas Pliego explained that as a first step the vehi-
cles were to come from China and that in three years they 
would be produced in mexico. once the assembly plant 
was finished, it would have an annual production capacity 
of 100,000 cars. salinas Pliego added: “today is an im-
portant day for Grupo salinas. We started a business line 
that we do not know. We will learn and we will do lots 
of cars and very well made.” salinas Pliego indicated that 
this was a very important investment for mexico, because 
a Chinese company saw the country as a very good field 
for investment. He thanked the General President of faW 
Group, Zhu yanfeng, who took the mexican entrepreneurs 
into account (al volante, 2009). 
additionally, the companies intended to set up R&d lab-
oratories in mexico with an investment of Us$12 million 
and the objective of designing vehicles and bodies for mar-
kets in mexico and latin america (vera, 2008). on april 
7, 2008, as part of the plant project, faW Group President 
Wang Gang and the President of Grupo salinas motors, 
Javier sarro, signed a letter of understanding to create an 
R&d center. 
for michoacán, the plant represented one of its most im-
portant investment projects. the government of michoacán 
projected that it would trigger the industrial development 
of the state, anchor a new industrial zone, increase the 
economically active population by more than 5%, create a 
world-class R&d center, receive China’s largest investment 
in the country, contribute to develop local talent through 
linkage programs with 12 universities in the state of mi-
choacán, and result in a 5% increase in the GdP of micho-
acán (Gobierno del estado de michoacán, 2009).
importing and selling chinese cars
in 2007, officials from the ministry of economy authorized 
the importation of 5,000 f1 and f5 model vehicles from 
China, which arrived in mexico in october. the cars were 
disembarked in december, at the port of lázaro Cárdenas 
las truchas, michoacán, on mexico’s Pacific coast. How-
ever, the cars remained there until they received a release 
permit and were sold from mid-January of 2008, mainly 
in the federal district, the central states of mexico and 
morelos, the western state of michoacán, and the south-
eastern state of Guerrero (estrada & Guzmán, 2007). 
the firms built a network of dealers with sales floors and 
service centers. they did not use franchises so that the pro-
cess could be completely controlled from the time they as-
sembled the car until it was sold and returned to service, 
obtaining customer feedback along the way (Hoyo, 2007). 
the creation of specialized points of sale for the product, 
brand certified workshops, and access to original spare 
parts, were part of faW’s strategy (Gobierno del estado de 
michoacán, 2009).
making decisions in the face of a crisis
the 2008 Great Contraction that started in the United 
states and spread globally had a negative impact on the 
demand for cars in mexico. according to the international 
organization of automobile manufacturers (oiCa), world 
production in 2008 fell by 4.1% over the previous year 
(amia, 2010). the “asociación mexicana de la industria 
automotriz” (mexican association of the automotive in-
dustry—amia) indicated that in the first quarter of 2009, 
246,878 vehicles were sold, which was 100,182 fewer than 
in the same period the previous year. there were various 
causes for the decline, including the lack of credit, job in-
security, a general rise in prices for cars, as well as the 
constant increase in gasoline prices, taxes (vat, isan, and 
tenencia, which were annual fees for having a vehicle), and 
payments for services such as verification, plates, and in-
surance against theft and accidents. in 2008, automo-
bile credit decreased by 12%. financial institutions were 
not only reluctant to provide credit, but also imposed ad-
ditional restrictions on lending money (Ciiam, 2008a). 
fearful consumers stopped buying cars and new vehicle 
sales in december fell nearly 20%, closing the year with a 
contraction of 6.8% (Globedia, 2009) (see figure 1).
mexico’s federal government gave the automobile industry 
a rescue package to stay afloat during the crisis. “about 
60 major companies related to the automotive industry 
are expected to benefit from technical stoppage Program 
developed by the mexican government, which is designed 
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to help companies through the third payment of salaries to 
avoid layoffs” (Cárdenas & Hernández, 2009).
By 2009, faW found that acceptance of its imported products 
was low among mexican consumers, despite the competi-
tive prices, and this compounded the impact of the crisis. 
the location of the planned plant had been suffering from 
violence because of the government’s war against drug 
trafficking and organized crime, and subsequent retalia-
tion by drug cartels. furthermore, faW received more bad 
news: their cars did not meet dot safety and pollution 
standards in the United states, a market that it wanted to 
serve from mexico. all these factors led to a delay in the 
investment in the assembly plant (frost & sullivan, 2009).
Ricardo salinas Pliego needed to address these challenges. 
there was lower-than-expected demand for the cars it had 
already imported and for which it had established a sales 
and repair network, and the economic crisis and inability 
to export to the United states threatened the viability of 
the production plant. as he headed for another meeting, 
he wondered if there was a future for Grupo salinas in the 
car industry or whether it would have to stop selling Chi-
nese cars in mexico. 
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teaching notes
overview
in 2007, Ricardo salinas Pliego, the President of Grupo sa-
linas, one of the largest mexican business groups, started 
negotiations with faW, a leading Chinese car company, to 
import Chinese cars to mexico as a first step towards the 
manufacturing of Chinese automobiles in mexico to serve 
the domestic market and export to the United states and 
latin america.  
the group, which had been selling Chinese-made italika 
motorcycles through its retailer, elektra, was hoping to 
repeat this success by selling Chinese cars, but needed a 
partner. the search for a partner led to an alliance with the 
Chinese firm faW. Planning to produce cars in mexico en-
abled the firms to avoid paying the punishing import tar-
iffs of 50%, which would make the imports uncompetitive. 
at the end of 2007, the company celebrated the first stone 
ceremony for the assembling plant in Zinapécuaro, micho-
acán, with the presence of the President of mexico, indi-
cating the importance of the alliance for job creation. in 
2008, the alliance started selling imported cars in the met-
ropolitan area of mexico City, attracting customers with 
low prices and easy credit payments. However, sales suf-
fered due to low acceptance of the models, as well as the 
2008 crisis that reduced financing. additionally, the cars 
did not comply with U.s. safety and environmental stan-
dards, eliminating the possibility of exporting them to the 
United states. these factors raised questions about the vi-
ability of the assembly plant. 
thus, in 2009, Ricardo salinas found himself facing a di-
lemma: Whether to continue with the assembly plant or to 
stop importing and selling Chinese cars in mexico. 
teaching objectives
the case can be used to cover several topics in strategic 
management and international business courses, such as 
business growth, international alliances, and crisis man-
agement. in the analysis of business growth, students 
can discuss the different options for taking advantage of 
market opportunities and diversifying across industries. in 
the study of alliance management, students can explore 
the benefits and difficulties in the creation of an alliance 
among developing-country firms, the complementarity be-
tween partners, and the divergence of objectives. in the 
analysis of crisis management, students can study the deci-
sion to stay with an existing strategic plan, change course 
and revise the plan, or follow a wait-and-see strategy in the 
face of an external economic crisis.
discussion questions
Business growth strategies:
1) Why did Grupo salinas decide to enter the automobile 
industry? What were the benefits of this strategy? What 
were the limitations? 
2) Which alternative business strategy could have been 
implemented by Grupo salinas to sell automobiles?
3) Why did Grupo salinas invest in the plant? What are 
the benefits and limitations of its location? 
international alliances: 
4) Why did Grupo salinas seek an alliance? What were the 
benefits? What were the limitations? 
5) Were Chinese cars the best option? Was faW the best 
option? What would you recommend? 
managing a crisis:
6) What are the options in the face of low sales levels? 
What are the benefits of each? What are the costs of 
each? Which one do you recommend?
conceptual background
the main objective is to generate and discuss different per-
spectives on the process of growing via a strategic alliance 
for Grupo salinas and faW amid a global crisis, and the 
impact that the introduction of Chinese cars could have on 
mexico and its automotive industry. a secondary objective 
is deciding whether to maintain a strategy or change it. 
Useful references to provide background concepts for the 
discussion are Hughes and Weiss (2007), santora (2008), 
Williamson and Zeng (2009), and Kale and singh (2009). 
there are several points to discuss in partnerships like that 
between Grupo salinas and faW. according to Hughes 
and Weiss, the conventional advice from the experts is 
quite consistent: “focus on defining a business plan” or 
“minimize conflict” (figure 1).
alliances pose special challenges that make traditional 
management practices irrelevant. these partnerships re-
quire two companies to cooperate with one another while 
simultaneously competing in the same market, and the 
participants must navigate often maddening differences 
in operating styles.
Hughes and Weiss (2007) recommend these practices for 
managing alliances:
1) Develop the right working relationship. define exactly 
how you will work together. for example, clarify what 
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“mutual trust and respect” means to each of you. arti-
culate how you will make decisions, allocate resources, 
and share information.
2) Peg metrics to progress. alliances require time to pay 
off financially. supplement “ends” metrics (financial 
performance indicators) with “means” metrics asses-
sing factors that will affect the alliance’s ultimate per-
formance (such as information sharing and new-idea 
development).
3) Leverage differences. Companies ally to take advantage 
of partners’ different know-how, markets, customers, 
and suppliers. 
4) Encourage collaboration. When a problem arises (such 
as a missed milestone), replace finger-pointing with dis-
passionate analysis of how both parties contributed to 
it and what each can do to improve it.
5) Manage internal stakeholders. most external alliances 
depend on cooperation from internal units in each 
partner company. ensure that all internal players in-
volved in supporting the alliance are committed to its 
success.
adding to these ideas, santora’s (2008) article mentions 
that a strategic alliance is a relationship between two or 
more companies that agree to conduct negotiations on 
trade, development, and fundraising with mutual relevant 
benefits. trust is the initial condition for the development of 
a strategic alliance and the main point for construction and 
prosperity. trust is the reliance of one person on another for 
his integrity, character, or skill. When trust between com-
panies in not strong, the alliance moves directly towards 
failure (figure 2).
Williamson and Zeng (2009) suggest that value for money 
has again become a strategic imperative, and not just be-
cause of the recession. in developing countries, consumers 
are traditionally value conscious. many have entered the 
consuming class recently and have limited disposable 
income. in the developing world, therefore, delivering value 
for money has become critical. What capabilities must com-
panies possess to thrive in this environment? the authors 
suggest that instead of refining cost-cutting techniques, 
companies should develop cost-innovation capabilities. 
they must learn to reengineer their cost structures in novel 
ways so they can offer customers dramatically more for 
less. that may not be good news for many U.s., european, 
and Japanese corporations, which have usually dealt with 
low-cost competitors by going up-market and creating pre-
mium segments, both at home and abroad. 
FigUre 2. a Hierarchical Framework of trust
level 4
trust
Continued Relationship
level 3
some trust
initial Relationship
level 2
emerging trust
Possible Relationship
level 1
no trust
no Possible Relationship
source: information from santora (2008).
in the face of growing competition, the high rate of tech-
nological change, and discontinuities within most indus-
tries, firms pursue a large number of alliances to access 
new resources, enter new markets or arenas, or minimize 
their risk.
at the level of a single alliance of a firm, certain factors 
at each stage of the alliance life cycle are critical to alli-
ance success (figure 3). if a firm selects a complementary, 
FigUre 1. Five principles that complement conventional advice
placing less emphasis on… ….and more emphasis on
defining the right business arrangement developing the right working relationship
Creating ends metrics Creating means metrics
eliminating differences embracing differences
establishing formal alliance management systems and structures enabling collaborative behavior
managing the external relationship with partners managing your own internal stakeholders
source: information from Hughes and Weiss (2007).
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compatible, and committed partner at the time of alliance 
formation, and makes relevant choices with respect to 
alliance design in terms of equity or contractual or rela-
tional governance, the alliance is more likely to succeed. 
during the post-formation stage, alliance success depends 
on the effective use of relevant coordination mechanisms 
to manage the interdependence between the two firms, 
and the successful development of trust between partners 
as the alliance evolves. alliance capability requires atten-
tion to both a dedicated alliance function within a firm, 
and a set of institutionalized processes to accumulate and 
leverage alliance management know-how across the firm.
analysis
this case shows the differences in objectives between the 
two companies in a strategic alliance. on the one hand, 
mexico’s Grupo salinas wants to grow its market base in 
the country’s Base of the Pyramid (BoP), and on the other 
hand, the Chinese faW group’s interest is to expand its 
market presence in the United states through mexico. this 
divergence of objectives is evident in the moment that an 
event that is exogenous to the business appears (the be-
ginning of the global crisis in 2008). this shows that the 
commitment of both parties was not strong.
a firm like Grupo salinas needed to learn more about the 
effectiveness of this partnership and its abilities, as well 
as how to manage certain new types of alliances in new 
markets, generate incremental value by taking a portfolio 
approach to managing alliances, and realize gains by ex-
tending its alliance capabilities to become a relational or-
ganization that is adept at successfully managing other 
inter-firm relationships, including acquisitions.
failure factors highlighted in the alliance between Grupo 
salinas and faW:
FigUre 3. alliances: Key success Factors
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source: information from Kale and singh (2009).
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1) the objectives did not seem consistent amid a global 
crisis and a market was not ready.
2) the constant communication and interaction between 
businesses was declining.
3)  neither of the parties had the ability to grow the mu-
tual business.
in other words, alliances are not just fixed negotiations, 
but rather they require a high degree of independence 
between the companies, who must identify these differ-
ences between partners and ways of operation; these fea-
tures form the common denominator in the handling of an 
alliance.
What happened to the Chinese cars? By 2010, Grupo sa-
linas planned to support the Chinese cars sold, while faW 
stopped the operations. the company said in its fourth 
quarter of 2009 report that the cost for the suspension 
of marketing of faW cars was $276 million and it suffered 
the “plight of the global automotive industry”. 
teaching plan
the teaching plan can be adjusted depending on the 
length of the class and the number of students, but the 
plan below is a suggestion.
Business growth strategies (30 minutes):
start the discussion by identifying the reasons for diversi-
fying into the automobile industry. the discussion can be 
organized on two sides of a whiteboard, with the pros on 
one side and the cons on the other. the decision seems to 
make little sense because the firm has no experience in 
automobiles or the infrastructure to sell them. However, 
the Ceo seems to think it is a good opportunity and can 
use the experience of importing motorcycles from China 
to serve an underserved market segment. it is a new in-
dustry for the firm but the business group is used to man-
aging diverse businesses and sees automobiles as a new 
growth opportunity. the experience with motorcycles was 
positive, but this worked well because elektra already had 
a distribution infrastructure through which motorcycles 
could be sold. the problem with automobiles is that the 
company does not have the distribution in place and has 
to create a new distribution network, and they are higher 
priced items for which not only price but also perceptions 
of safety play a role in the purchase decision. in addition, 
low-income consumers can easily buy secondhand cars 
from the United states. 
then discuss the options for implementing the decision. 
the easiest way is importing Chinese cars; however, this 
is limited by regulation in mexico against imports. Hence, 
the firm needs to consider producing cars. the next de-
cision would be the location. if the objective of faW is 
to export to the United states it would make more sense 
to produce near the U.s. border than in the center of the 
country. Hence the decision seems to be driven by the sa-
linas Group and its desire to sell in mexico and the rest 
of latin america, as the location is well connected within 
mexico, and to a port. this discussion of location can take 
place here, or later when discussing the alliance. 
international alliances (20 minutes): 
the second topic is the analysis of the needs of Grupo sa-
linas and how these are met by a Chinese partner. the ben-
efits of the alliance are that there are complementarities 
between the two firms—one has expertise in the country 
and the other has expertise in producing cars. Grupo sa-
linas was actually looking for a Chinese partner and ended 
up with faW when Geely was not available, thus raising 
questions about the commitment and interest of faW to 
the success of the venture. faW seems to see the invest-
ment as an entry point into the U.s. market, while Grupo 
salinas seems to be interested in serving the mexican and 
latin american low-income segments, creating the poten-
tial for a conflict. 
managing a crisis (20 minutes):
the third topic is the analysis of decisions during a crisis. 
the economic crisis challenges the viability of the project, 
but it was already challenged by the inability to export to 
the U.s., which reduced the interest of the Chinese partner. 
moreover, the low level of acceptance of the cars and the 
limited distribution network also affected the viability of 
the project. the “made in China” label does have a nega-
tive connotation in the country, which may not be over-
come by a low price since there are secondhand cars from 
the U.s. market as alternatives to inexpensive new cars. 
the traditional alternatives of continuing as planned, 
versus adapting to the new conditions, versus exiting, can 
be coached in terms of the voice, loyalty, and exit frame-
work. the company can continue as planned. it could ask 
the government for support to bring the plant to success. 
alternatively it can decide to wait and see how deep the 
crisis is and continue importing cars. However, this option 
is not viable because of the regulation of imports, which 
only allows for three years of tariff-free imports before be-
ginning local production. the third alternative is to discard 
the plan of investing in the production plant. this does 
avoid the loss of the investment but it also limits the ability 
of the firm to grow in the market while still having to serve 
the previously sold cars in the future. the service could be 
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outsourced to another company, but Grupo salinas would 
have to write off the investments in the network. for faW, 
in contrast, the decision not to invest is less complicated. it 
has already benefitted from exporting cars for three years 
and learned about the mexican market, while having few 
investments in the country. this discussion can be placed 
on the whiteboard in three columns, discussing the bene-
fits and limitations of each. the recommendation depends 
on the value given to the reputation of the company and 
the understanding of whether past investments should de-
termine future ones. 
Conclusions (10 minutes):
the conclusions of the case can be a discussion of invest-
ment decisions under uncertain conditions and the need 
to analyze the potential of an investment opportunity for 
a particular company rather than the absolute benefit for 
any company.
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